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COMMUNITY HEAI.TH STUDIES
VOLUME X I I I . NUMRER 2, I989
REVIEW ARTICLE
Bioethics, Faith and Reason: Recent Writing in Medical Bioethics*
Neville Hicks and Annette Braunack-Mayer
Department of Communitji Meilicine. The Universitj?of Adelaide.
At least three ot these hooks are taith statements.
One is a summa or an apologia (the distinction is
rarely clear) and one is a sequel to an earlier summa.
They are worth considering from that perspective at
a time when medical ethics is being treated in
Australia as yet another value-neutral technology:
“All medical students should do communications
skills. so they can manage the difficult patient better.
Oh, yes -~and ethics, too”.
It is usually thought poor form to refer to a writer
personally, before considering his book. There is a
temptation to transgress the rule in the case of
Tristram Engelhardt because he has been one of the
more noticeable performers at major ethics
conferences in Australia in 1986 and 1987. On each
occasion he has played the role of the Texas
libertarian - a state (in both senses) where cowboy
boots add a macho inch, where a man must do what
a man must do and where he may need a gun to do it.
Engelhardt has also displayed impressive erudition
in three or four languages and two disciplines -he
carries a scholar’s six-gun.
It is Engelhardt’s opinion. shared with
Maclntyre, that the Western religious consensus
evaporated after Luther and the Western hope of a
rationalist and universal morality evaporated after
the Enlightenment.’ Hence the current problem is
“how to fashion an ethic for biomedical problems
that can speak with rational authority across the
great diversity of moral viewpoints”. Engelhardt
thinks that codes of law and religious traditions are
“too parochial or too arbitrary to bind together
individuals from varying traditions or
communities”. It follows that we need a secular

bioethics but he can find no basis for secular ethics
that does not lead to the brink of relativism. Faced
with that difficulty, he argues that “ethics is an
enterprise in controversy resolution”. If it achieved
no more than that, ethics would be a socially
valuable enterprise but, in travelling to that point,
Engelhardt has already left behind the ‘Foundations’
in his title.*
Relativism is a nuisance but distinct moral
values, nurtured in communities, remain important
because we learn through them what is good,
worthwhile and right (or not) to do.’ There is a
problem, however: the people who are trying to
resolve controversy by ‘doing ethics’ are schooled in
discrete moral values, nurtured in communities, and
the principles that they can agree on will be low in
content, while principles that are high in content will
be difficult to generalize. This observation is the
foundation of Engelhardt’s general argument that
ethics is a contention between two principles,
autonomy and beneficence. Autonomy has
universal application but minimal informative
content: beneficence can have substantial specific
content but is culture-specific:
“At the very roots of ethics there is a tension. . .
between respecting the freedom and securing the
best interests of persons“.
Much of The Foundations of Rioethics
represents an attempt to work through the
consequences of that tension. In addition,
Engelhardt finds himself obliged to discuss what is
meant by “persons”. He makes the Kantian
assumption that moral concern is focussed on
persons, not just humans. A person in the strict sense

‘Christie RJ and Hoffmaster CB. Eihical h u e s in.fami/vmedicine. New York: Oxford University Press,
1986.
Daniels N. Just Health Care. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Engelhardt HT. The Foundations of Rioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Shelp EE. Born to die? Deciding the.fate qfcriticallv ill newborns. New York: The Free Press, 1986.
Veatch R M . The,foundations of justice: Why the retarded and the rest qfus have claims to equality. New
York: Oxford llniversity Press, 1986.
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is a moral agent, he says, to be distinguished from a
person in the social sense, who is accorded rights
without duties in a socially variable fashion. Moral
persons must be self-conscious, free to choose,
rational, and able to understand the pertinence of
blame and praise. (People who care for the advanced
aged might begin to worry, at this point, how many
of their charges would pass the personhood test and what is to be done to or for them if they do not
pass.)
Engelhardt claims that the intention of his
distinction between persons in the strict and social
senses is to make it impossible to duck the moral
standard of persons in the strict sense. He defends
the social assignment of social personhood on the
grounds that “utilitarianism has been responsible for
a great proportion of the liberal advances” in the
rights of the retarded and the senile. That looks a
particularly slippery defence: it depends not on
philosophical arguments but on historical ones
which many social historians would regard as
unsettled. In addition, it is utilitarianism, whether
claiming the label or not, which drives much present
effort to retrench the rights of the retarded and the
senile. To reduce the matter to a phrase, there is a
high probability that Kantianism forced to marry
utilitarianism will change its name to utilitarianism.
The suspicion that what Engelhardt is defending
is a Texas-libertarian-Kantian person deepens when
he argues that human foetal and embryonic life have
only the value that they have for actual (that is,
social) persons. Actual persons contemplating the
termination of a pregnancy may be social persons
with mortgages and prospective careers; actual
persons contemplating what might be needed to
sustain decent care for the demented elderly are
social persons who vote on taxes. Their taxes are
paid to governments to which Engelhardt will allow
only that authority which does not interfere with the
“consensual action of free individuals, including the
use of their private property”.
In his chapters on “The Languages of
Medicalization” and on “Free and Informed
Consent”, Engelhardt does recognize the kinds of
powers in society which make it difficult to settle for
an ethic which concentrates on persons in the strict
sense. Practitioners, who are active daily in health
care, develop authority relative to patients, who are
intermittent visitors to that arena. Professions with
authority are likely to acquire political power that
other people cannot command. Power and authority
always threaten to push beneficence into the ditch of
paternalism, where it will drown autonomy.
Engelhardt recognizes these problems but his faith in
the liberty of individuals makes it difficult for him to
contemplate, say, the doctrines of justice which
attract other ethicists.
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Consider, for example, the story of Eddie
Conrad, a mentally retarded 10-year-old with
hearing, visual and speech impairments. Eddie’s
school is unable to afford the intensive speech
therapy he needs without cutting other services, like
the art, music and physical education curricula. How
are the parents, teachers and school to reconcile
Eddie’s claims for fair treatment with those of the
rest of the school community? Veatch begins 7he
Foundations of Justice with this vignette and weaves
it into his analysis of how to distribute health care
resources justly.
The Foundations of Justice builds on the thesis
Veatch developed in A Theory of Medical Ethics.4
In the Theory. . ., he argued that rational people
would agree on a contract for their society which
incorporated a number of basic ethical principles.
Different philosophical assumptions and premises
might motivate different people, so the contract
would have three tiers: a broad, Rawlsian social
contract on which all would agree; a second contract
between society and the professions it licenses: and
particular contracts - for example, between
mothers and home-birthing doctors. One of the
problems which the three-tiered approach
acknowledged was that consensus seems to
disintegrate when questions of justice and the
allocation of resources are raised: religious thinkers,
for example, tend to opt for an egalitarian notion of
justice; secular thinkers hold a diversity of views. In
Engelhardt’s terms, justice is rich in content but
parochial in acceptability.
In 7he Foundations of Justice Veatch sets
himself the ambitious task of formulatinga principle
of justice acceptable to all people. He begins with a
historical survey of the notion of equality in Jewish
and Christian thought, showing that both religions
have maintained a stream of concern for the poor,
the weak and the oppressed. The theological
justification for this concern lies in their shared
doctrines of God (before whom all people are equal
in their finitude), Creation (all resources are a gift
from God) and Stewardship (finite people have their
resources on trust). From these doctrines it is only a
short step to an egalitarian principle ofjustice which
distributes resources between creatures (usually only
human ones, in practice!) on the basis of need.
Secular philosophers struggling with the
principle of justice appeal not to faith but to reason
and experience. Veatch considers the premises and
arguments of these secular perspectives under three
headings - Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism
and Nozick’s entitlement position (which
Engelhardt probably would find most congenial) and finds that the logic and rationality dance upon
an underlying set of unargued (and unarguable)
assumptions about the nature of humanity,
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parent-child relationships, legislative responses and
developments in neonatal medicine. The ethics of
neonatal intensive care is one of the classic topics of
bioethics in both the United States and the United
Kingdom (a point worth remarking on, given other
divergences between the ethics industries of the two
countries). It is also a topic about which the
temptation is ever-present to collapse ethical
dilemmas into technical rules.5 Shelp’s main thesis
stands on three premises. The first is that,
historically and legally, children have been
considered in relation to their parents: accordingly,
parents bear the chief responsibility for the care and
nurture of children. Secondly, the parental role
should be seen as one of preparing the child for
independence: at a minimum, parents should aim to
foster in their children “a capability to relate,
communicate, ambulate and perform tasks of basic
hygiene, feeding, and dressing”. Thirdly, the moral
pluralism of our society legitimizes a broad range of
parental responses to the dilemmas surrounding
critically ill newborns.
The thesis itself is that parents are the proper
decision-makers in situations concerning the
imperilled neonate. Provided that their choices
comply with those of any reasonable member of the
moral community (and Shelp adopts a fairly loose
definition of ‘reasonable’), parents should be free to
make any decision they think appropriate. The
neonatologist’s role is that of a “sustaining presence”
who advises and co-operates with parents who are
responsible for deciding the fate of their infant.
Indeed, Shelp concludes, parents who choose active
euthanasia for an infant “who will never attain a
personal existence, never experience life as a net
value, and/or never achieve a minimum level of
independence” should be supported in their
decision.
Shelp also suggests that human neonates are not
‘persons’ in the same sense as normal older humans
(not ‘persons in the strict sense’, as Engelhardt would
define them) and that the kill/let die distinction has
no moral force. While it may be difficult to sustain a
distinction between killing and letting die in
borderline situations in neonatal intensive care, the
more general distinction between commissions and
omissions has been regarded as necessary by legal,
moral and religious traditions. We would all
recognize the difference in moral responsibility
between throwing a baby into a raging torrent and
patrolling river banks in case babies fell in.6 The
whole topic of parental responsibility is much more
complex than Shelp’s treatment of it might indicate.
For example, he does not address satisfactorily the
question of how to deal with those parental choices
which are not ‘reasonable’ whereas even Engelhardt,
despite appearing to regard neonates as the property

ownership of property and human responsibility for
others. Veatch’s assessment is that whether one
adopts an egalitarian or antiegalitarian stance will
depend ultimately on “faith moves” that are similar
to those made within the Jewish or Christian
tradition.
Despite having argued that there is no logical
priority of one set of beliefs over others, Veatch
concludes that egalitarianism is the more “natural”
and more “plausible” option. The rest of the book
articulates a theory of justice which is radically
egalitarian and demands striving for equality of
outcome. His equality of outcome is really a very
‘strong’ version of equality of opportunity: it would
discriminate in favour of the person born with only
four fingers to ensure to that person the same
opportunity of winning the Chopin prize as someone
with ten fingers. In practice, Veatch believes that this
radical egalitarianism will mean directing far more
resources into medical and educational services for
the handicapped, so that their welfare, measured
over a lifetime, is as close to the average as possible.
Veatch recognizes some of the counter-intuitive
implications of his conclusions. He notes that other
ethical principles (for example, autonomy) may have
claims against justice in some circumstances. He is
also worried by what his concept of justice may
mean for the ethic of competition. Taking sport and
higher education as examples, he suggests that the
only real arguments in favour of rewards relate to the
good that those with natural ability may bring to
the community. Concentrating less on competition
and more on co-operation could only be good
for society.
The Foundations qf Justice is both an excellent
introduction to egalitarian notions of justice and a
lucid application of justice theory to the problems of
the handicapped. However, Veatch’s arguments in
favour of equality as the measure of a just society are
unlikely to convince those who are not already
sympathetic to his views. The ‘faith moves’that lead
Veatch to adopt an egalitarian stance can not, on his
own admission, logically compel others to do the
same. Even people who would usually stand in the
same camp as Veatch may find his hardline support
for equal outcomes offensive. Perhaps the great
strength of The Foundations of Justice is that it does
set out clearly where radical commitment of equality
in health care may lead.
Whereas Veatch tackles ethical problems at a
societal level, Shelp’s Born to Die? is concerned far
more with decision-making at the level of
individuals. Shelp is writing about who should be
responsible for decisions concerning seriously ill
newborns and how far that responsibility should
extend. It would be particularly helpful for anyone
looking for an ethical perspective on the literature on
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of parents, rather than as persons in the strict sense,
would secure some rights to them in the light of
consequences relevant to each case. Veatch takes a
different approach again. He argues that parents
should pursue the welfare of their children in single
minded fashion, without regard for competing
interests outside their family unit. He does not
appear to recognize that a parent’s notion of’child’s
best interests’ might not be the child’s. It must be
said, in addition, that Shelp’s position offers little
support to the medical and nursing personnel who
are left to stand on the sidelines
supporting in
practice a decision they may not support in
conscience.’
One older neonatologist of our acquaintance
found Born /o Die.’>absorbingand illuminating. We
suspect that at least some of his enthusiasm was due
to the fact that Shelp was preaching to a convert.
Readers are likely to find Shelp’s arguments
persuasive only if they are predisposed to accept
them. In short, you will need to share his “faith
moves” to be convinced.
Teachers of ethics to health care students become
used to playing spot-theethical-issue in the neonatal
intensive care unit and IVF clinic. Indeed, one
feature of much of the voluminous American writing
in bioethics is its concentration upon cases in
extremis, in exotic settings. No doubt this is partly a
reflection of the way in which medical work in
America is organized but it does. also, fuel the
misgiving that bioethics is a dance upon a stage of
social arrangements and values that are not
themselves subjected to ethical analysis. Just Health
Care and Ethical Issues in Farnilv Medicine are
important books in this connection because each
represents an effort toaddress the health-care system
as well as the obvious dilemmas which arise within
its units.
Norman Daniels has been gnawing away for
several years at the ethical implications of the
American health care system.” That material is
pulled together and reworked, to some extent, in
Jus/ Healrh Care: the first four chapters are an effort
to spell out the philosophical implications of the title
phrase; chapters five to eight apply the philosophy to
questions of aged care, occupational health and the
role of providers of health care; the last chapter is a
brief enquiry into the usefulness for policy-makers of
the kind of analysis presented in the preceding
chapters. It must be said that the result is a collection
of papers tending towards a theme, rather than a
finished thesis.
In his introduction Daniels observes that the
cost-containing environment in the United States is
not alive with interest in philosophical questions
about justice in the distribution of healthcare. Given
the role-in-exile of the unspeakable ‘L-word’ in the

recent American election, he is probably right!
Indeed. even to raise the topic is to invoke a flock of
‘L-questions’:
“To find . . . principles of justice for health care
we must address questions such as these:
What kind of a social good is health care? What
are its functions and do these make it different
from other commodities?
Are there social obligations to provide health
care?
What inequalities in its distribution are morally
acceptable?
What limits d o provider autonomy and
individual liberties of physicians or patients place
on the just distribtuion of health care?”
In an effort to answer those questions, Daniels
asks another: is health care special? His answer has
been the point of much of the criticism of his work9
and wanders over two chapters of this book. Some
people argue that health care needs are not special,
provided that each person has a fair share of
resources and income, “adequate to meet reasonable
needs”. Daniels holds that the scale used to measure
needs should consider needs that are “objectively
ascribable” and “objectively important”. To
construct the better scale, he sets off after the notion
of “species-typical functioning”, proceeding, by a
rather circuitous argument, to define diseases as
“deviations from the natural functional organization
of a typical member of a species”. He asserts that the
line between disease and absence of disease is
generally agreed and easy to draw - though more
than a few historians of concepts of disease would
doubt it.’” His next step is a shift to the notion of
“normal opportunity range”: individual shares of the
normal range of talents and skills will not be equal
because disease detracts from the capacity of an
individual to command that position on the normal
range of opportunity which “his skills and talents
would have made available to him were he healthy”.
With health care, as with education, one is
addressing “needs which are not equally distributed
among individuals” but the unequal distribution of
those needs has “great strategic importance for
opportunity”. At that point the Daniels L-faith
statement appears: “from the perspective of
justice, . . the moral function of the health care
system must be to help guarantee fair equality of
opportunity.” That bald statement raises the
question of equity of access to health care, about
which there is little consensus because “access is itself
a complicated notion . .[;I health care services are
non-homogenous [and] have many functions” and
questions about equitable access reflect more basic
questions about distributive justice.
Daniels reviews a number of the accounts of
what might be involved in equitable access to health

~
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care before concentrating, appropriately in the
present climate of economism, on the role of the
market as a distributor. The market approach
amounts to saying that access to health care is
equitable if there are “no information barriers,
financial barriers or supply anomalies that prevent
access to a reasonable or decent basic minimum of
health care services.” Even if the first three criteria
were met, the difficulty would remain of deciding
what is “a decent basic minimum”. T o define it
relative to existing social practices “risks
incorporating into the decent basic minimum all that
is already askew in the health care system”.
In any case, Daniels argues, these attempts to
specify the “good” in health care miss the point that
the system’s capacity to enhance fair equality of
opportunity is the best test ofitsjustice. Headds that
a system providing fair equality of opportunity is
compatible with a multi-tiered health care system,
“provides a principled way of characterising the
health services that fall in the socially guaranteed
tier” and “does not insist on equality of amenities
that do not affect health status”. Critics of the overtly
two-tiered system which prevailed in Australia for
many years (and threatens to return) - or observers
of the‘creaming’and’dumping’whichDRG funding
promotes in American hospitals - might be less
sanguine.”
If our account of the first half of Just Health
Cure seems laboured, we could plead the laborious
style of the book, in mitigation- though that would
constitute a second lapse of form. It would be fairer
to Daniels to point out that he is a pioneer in the
topics he has addressed: the number of American
bioethicists with whom he could have debated his
approach to public health and social justice is not
large.’* The book is difficult but readers of this
journal who have little appetite for philosophy
should consider at least the chapter “Am I My
Parents’ Keeper”and the chapters on the powers of
the American Occupational Health and Safety
Administration and on the dilemma between risk
and opportunity which is involved in efforts to
enforce workplace safety. All three chapters raise
ideas which could enrich the discussions ofaged care
and worker safety in Australia.
Christie and Hoffmaster’s ethical perspective
looks less like a faith statement than Engelhardt’s,
Veatch’s or Daniels’ but their work has some of the
evangelical tone that seems to go with family
medicine. Like Daniels’, their work is remarkable
because of their interest in a field of health care
beyond the critical moment and the hospital setting.
Like Daniels, again. they plough in a lonely
paddock.’’ We have found, in addition, that the
large range of cases in their book can help to draw
useful ethical reflections from medical students who
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have just returned from general practice placements.
The first section of Ethical Issues in Farniiv
Medicine deals with theoretical issues which arise
from a role-description of family medicine not
dissimilar to the description of general practice
favoured by the Royal Australian College of
General Practitioners. Family medicine/general
p r a c t i c e involves p r o v i d i n g c o n t i n u i n g ,
comprehensive care for the whole person, taking on
“problems of living”, preventing ill-health and acting
as the patient’s advocate in dealings with the health
system. Christie and Hoffmaster argue that such a
role creates a moral expectation that physicians will
assume broad responsibility for the welfare of their
patients and will intervene in the psychological,
behavioural, social and environmental dimensions
of their patients’ lives.
The assumption of ‘broad responsibility’,
Christie and Hoffmaster suggest, could mean that it
is appropriate for the doctor to withhold a diagnosis,
if giving information would harm the patient. At this
point, all good libertarians (and lots of other good
people) will throw up their hands and yell ‘What
about autonomy?’ Christie and Hoffmaster suggest
that autonomy is an ambiguous and abstract
concept, of little value in the real world. To grant
autonomy primary status is to relegate the physician
to a passive role. The conclusion of this section of the
book is that any framework for medical ethics
founded only on a theoretical approach to ethical
dilemmas can be of little help to the family physician.
The second section of the book offers an
alternative to the jaundiced view of ‘togdown’
approaches: it proposes a framework which begins
with the scrutiny of cases and works up to principles.
The authors explore the ethical problems which arise
in family practice and use their definition of family
medicine to offer guidelines for decision-making for example, there is a well-balanced study of the
practical and philosophical dimensions of
controlling patients’ access to information, conflicts
of values between patient and physician and
intervening in patients’ lifestyles. The result is an
admirable attempt to place the experience of the
general practitioner on the ethical agenda.
The attempt to provide a coherent theoretical
framework is less successful. The ‘bottom-up’
approach is more ‘topdown’ than Christie and
Hoffmaster care to admit; too often, the choice
which they deem ethically appropriate is determined
not by the peculiarities of the case but by the
definition of family medicine which they have
advocated. The chapter on autonomy is also
particularly disappointing. Their argument that the
principle of autonomy is open to a variety of
mutually exclusive interpretations, and therefore
useless in the real world, is simplistic. A more subtle

233

COMMUNITY HEALTH STUDIES

analysis would have chosen from the definitions
offered that which best suited the work of the family
physician, and balanced it judiciously against the
commitment to patient welfare.
We have described several of these books as faith
statements: the title of our review suggests that we
think it no bad thing if the description is valid. The
choice of title, and our faith statement about
bioethics, demand some comment. Bioethics is a
boom topic in Australia, as it has been in America.
Even in our little corner of the continent, the past
four years have produced requests to teach or
present papers on ethics to medical students, general
nurses, physiotherapists, health surveyors, child
welfare workers, paediatric nurses, medical
administrators, political parties, hospital managers,
radiotherapists, senior nursing staff, health and
welfare chaplains, community nurses and medical
educators and migrant nurses. Higher degree
students keep bounding through the door. Earnest
seekers after truth could easily have found
themselves at an ethics conferencea month. In loftier
circles, bioethies centres have sprung up around the
country, Stntutory committees nnd public enquiries
and pnrtinmentury committees and Law Reform
Commissions have all addressed bioethical
queatisns, The Commonwealth government hus set
up a Natlonal Bioethieu Conuultative Committee to
advlue on the &hied, legal and aoeial iasues arisina
from aeientifle rrnd medierl teehnology (pnptieula~ly
npfoduetive technology), biomedieal and health
related nueareh, and the provision and delivery of
health sewiees, The National Health and Medied
Weueamh Counell hab pfodueed a npofi on ethieu in
teuwmh and tfbd to erttend it8 pP€itOedb to 0 t h
Commonweaith tlieneieu, while Institutional review
boafda; have become eommon,
WhPt doeb all this mean7 Teaehini ethies
un be pl;Oblem. h a y h&dth=8efd@b UtudefW,
ptaatieaily odented, ohen Bnd erue atudlee P relief
from rote=iramIng, down to earflk and not too
dlfhauit: piryln$ afrot=the=dllemmcr can be fun;
analybing the ethleal nasonlng or ctltielting the
man1 absumptlena may dmw iesb plnuditu. Some of
the eammlttees rnd boatdb have fulfilled the
dameetutiually neeebsafy, ethleaily vdid (In a
beeulati pluniIst bealety) "entetprlbe of aontfovetby
moiution"i Othetb have been neeuued of providing
the thetatleiii meen whleh will allow on@gtoup of
tinathet to pUtbU@ Itb bUblW5b Pb UfiUal. 8ome Of the
ddlvity hllh been designed t@dtaw a mi-intleof lee1
ptateutlon w e t the ptoblematlu eonbequenaab of

technological change in medicine and some has been
no more than a 'collapsing of ethical dilemmas into
technical rules'.
Not enough of the teaching, conferring and
enquiring, in our opinion, has extended to the
analysis of the values which drive Australian society
when it is doing health business. It is rare, outside
Catholic circles, to hear contributions which make a
faith statement and explore its implications. By
comparison, the Veatch and Engelhardt books are
valuable, but different, examples of how the texture
of ethical discussion might be enriched in our setting.
Do Australians still form a consensus around
egalitarian justice? If not, either what refurbishing of
that concept is necessary to make it acceptable or
what alternative value can bind us - where 'us'is the
population at large or the public health cadre? What
values drive the Medical Research Ethics
Committee of the NH&MRC; how widely are they
held; if they are not held widely, how is their
particularity defended? What are the consequences,
for the public health cadre or the medical profession
or particular groups of 'the population at large', of a
libettarian emphasis on individual autonomy?
Here, as in America, in our opinion, too much of
the ethice effort has been at the technolo&ally
pointy end of the medical induitry, By comparison,
the Daniels and Chrletie and Hoffmaeter books nre
valunble becnuee they attend to topieu like general
prrretiee and ~eeupntiontllhenlth and are of the
aged whieh will affect people for most of their live,.
Whnt is the agenda of the national eommitteei nnd
publie enquirlea in Australia? 1s the npndn yielded,
by defwlt, to IVF and intensive enre? Whnt would
need to k done to ensure that the committees m d
enquiries engaged a broader sgeetrum of the
population in a broadened agenda4
The eonJunetion of faith and PWIOH with
bioethles is a fefefence to an anelent debateP The
key question In bioethles, au in ethies generally, ia the
leefatie one, 'how should one live'?' That ia a
valuing, purposive question, about the juutlflmtion
of ilfti=aatiofib,The mest bBtiLtf&etOr;y&RbW@f to the
queution is not the Soel;atl%of Kantlan one, whieh
defineu morality by the rationality of ag~nts,but the
Afistotelian anbwef, which desefibes the
hafmonious life of agpta iii themselves and In
r;elation to other agents, It takeb stfonB aasumptlona
- P faith - @boutthe natun of life to shape an
ethieal view about how it ahould be iived; It takeu
pfaetlaal saaon to put the faith to wofk, in bioethias
au in ethies ge~efaliy,
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